History in the Making
Volume 6

Article 5

2013

A Historiography of Fascism
Glenn-Iain Steinback
CSUSB

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making
Part of the Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
Steinback, Glenn-Iain (2013) "A Historiography of Fascism," History in the Making: Vol. 6 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making/vol6/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted
for inclusion in History in the Making by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

Articles
History Department’s 2013 Faculty Choice Award

A Historiography of Fascism
By Glenn-Iain Steinback

Abstract: A long-standing historical debate revolves around the
definition, fundamental nature and historical constraints of the
concept of fascism. A wide array of scholarly questions about the
political and ideological nature of fascism, the minimum or
necessary traits of a fascist movement, arguments over the
classification of semi-fascist groups and the concept of generic
fascism characterize this debate. The result is a substantial body of
scholarly research replete with competing theories for the
evolution and origin of fascism as a concept, of individual fascist
movements and even over the geographic and temporal application
of the term itself within history. This paper is a historiography of
fascist studies that illuminates the development of the scholarly
narrative and understanding of fascism. Beginning with the
historically contemporary Marxist perceptive of fascism, this paper
examines competing and complimentary understandings of the
phenomenon across the twentieth century, including various
theories for the evolution of fascism in Europe, the relationship to
and placement of fascism in the broader political spectrum, and
the debate over fascism as a form of political religion. Finally, this
paper explores whether fascism is a temporally and geographically
limited dead historical phenomenon or an ongoing potential actor
in the politics of the modern world.
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Introduction
Within scholarly circles and popular culture the terms fascist and
fascism have had a long and contentious history. One reason for
this is that ‘fascism’ has a somewhat nebulous meaning. Derived
from the Latin word fasces, it connotes a bundle or union. In
addition, unlike liberals, communists, progressives or socialists,
fascists, with the noted exception of Italian Fascists, have often
declined to use this terminology to identify their movements.1 In
fact, the label has been used or misused more frequently by
opponents and detractors as a political epithet meant to broadly
paint a rival group or individual as evil, undemocratic or
totalitarian, than by fascist movements themselves. All polemics
aside, fascism both as an ideological movement and a political
force has played an important role in the development of the
modern world and left a major imprint on the history of the
twentieth century. Now in the twenty-first century events have
brought into question whether the zeitgeist of fascism is, in fact,
dead as well as the appropriateness of assessing fascism as an
exclusively historical concept. As a consequence, fascism has
proven to be and will surely remain a significant field of historical
inquiry. This paper will explore the evolution of that field of study,
highlighting and analyzing some of the important developments
that have appeared in the shifting understanding of the history of
fascism since it emerged on the world scene in the 1920s.
Attempts to arrive at a universally accepted scholarly
understanding of fascism have been plagued by several issues.
These include the debate over an appropriate geographic and
temporal application of the term, the difficulties in establishing an
agreed fascist minimum, the wide range of potentially fascist and
proto-fascist groups, arguments over the concept of a generic
fascism, the multiplicity of theories for the evolution of fascism,
and even debate over the validity of the term itself. As this essay
will demonstrate, the scholarly understanding of fascism has
changed substantially since the first attempts to document and
understand the fascist phenomenon. Today fascist studies have
expanded beyond an exclusive application to Italy and Germany,
1

Stanley G. Payne, A Hitory of Fascism 1914-1945 (London: Routledge, 2001),
3.
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developed alternatives to the early class based Marxist theories,
embraced interdisciplinary approaches and explored the concept of
minimum ideological and socio-political requirements for the
development of fascist movements. Collectively, these oftencompeting theories have provided a deepened understanding of the
development and origins of fascism, as well as more thorough
definitions of the subject in a debate, which is likely to continue
for some time to come.
The earliest attempts to understand, classify and document
the phenomenon of fascism occurred in the early 1920s, catalyzed
by the establishment of a fascist regime in Italy and the increasing
visibility of similar movements across inter war Europe. 2
Although a range of theories were advanced at the time by authors
from across the political spectrum, the Marxist-Leninist narrative
was the most developed and therefore, provided the first generic
theory of fascism.3
The Marxist perspective, best represented by the work of
Leon Trotsky and Georgi Dimitrov emphasized a connection
between fascist movements and business interests, asserting that
fascism was the final phase of bourgeois democracy transitioning
to dictatorship.4 Leon Trotsky was one of the earliest Marxist
thinkers to attempt to classify fascism and endeavor to articulate a
general theory, although his interest was motivated less by any
notion of historical purpose than a desire to understand fascism in
order to combat it.5 Writing in the early 1930s Trotsky perceived
fascism as a symptom of the progression of capitalism and the
ultimate undoing of capitalist society.6 He argued that wealthy
capitalists (finance capital) naturally destabilized their societies by
concentrating the means of production at the top, causing
increasing amounts of unrest among the proletariat. In response to
this unrest, he argued that capitalists allied themselves with the
petty bourgeoisie, turning them against the proletariat and creating
“special armed bands, trained to fight the workers just as certain
2

Constantin Iordachi, ed., Comparative fascist studies: New Perspectives
(London: Routledge, 2010), 6.
3
Ibid., 6-7.
4
Ibid., 7.
5
Leon Trotsky, Fascism: What it is and how to fight it. (Pioneer Publishers,
1944). accessed November 20, 2012,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm.
6
Trotsky, “Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie, and Proletariat,” in, Fascism.
(Pioneer Publishers, 1944).
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breeds of dog are trained to hunt game” – in other words, the
fascists.7 Consequently, Trotsky viewed fascism specifically within
the context of class warfare, arguing that it existed exclusively as a
capitalist tool. Fascism was therefore the creation of capitalism
used to intimidate, control and repress the proletariat in an attempt
to forestall what he saw as the eventual and inevitable proletariat
revolution.
As a result, the enduring if simplistic expression of the
Marxist position is best encapsulated by Georgi Dimitrov’s
assertion that “fascism is the power of finance capitalism itself."8
Marxist theories focused on economic factors while largely
ignoring the issue of fascism’s mass appeal and intentionally
discrediting its nationalist and revolutionary ideological themes.
Despite this narrow focus, Marxist writers were the first to
comment on the range of fascist style movements in Europe and
consequently pioneered the field of comparative fascist studies.
In the mid-1960s the prevailing Marxist socioeconomic
model was challenged simultaneously by several ground breaking
theories advanced by American and Western European scholars
seeking to expand the discussion beyond a reactionary class driven
approach. These theories attempted to account for an expanding
understanding of fascism as a distinct social and political
phenomenon. Chief among these scholars were Ernst Nolte and
George L. Mosse. In The Three Faces of Fascism, Nolte attempted
to advance a generic definition of fascism and explain the observed
rise of Italian and German fascism via a syncretic approach.
Nolte's analysis represented fascism as a form of revolutionary
anti-Marxism expressed as a “resistance to transcendence."9
Integral to this interpretation was the idea that fascism and
Bolshevism were both products of crisis in bourgeois society,

7

Trotsky, “The Collapse of Bourgeois Democracy” in Fascism (Pioneer
Publishers, 1944).
8
Georgi Dimitrov, “The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism” (main report
delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International,
August 2, 1935), accessed November 20, 2012.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm
9
Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Françoise Italian Fascism,
National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt Rinehart and
Winston, 1966), 429.
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operating by similar means but arriving at their positions using
different paths.10
Although both authors made important contributions to the
field, Nolte’s The Three Faces of Fascism proved eminently more
controversial; first because of his inclusion of Action Françoise as
a fascist movement and second because of the assertion, that
fascism and Bolshevism shared social and political methods, a
controversial assertion that implicitly normalized fascism. Nolte
advanced a Hegelian dialectic approach, drawing on
Enlightenment ideas to argue that the intellectual genesis of
fascism could be located in turn of the century France as an
intellectual anti-modern counter-revolution.11 He identified the
functional genesis of fascism as an anti-Marxist evolution of
nationalism growing out of the environment of post-World War I
Europe.12 He claimed that developmentally fascism owed key
elements of basic political and social methods and procedures;
primarily political violence, propaganda, motivating philosophy
and a nationalist narrative to Action Françoise and Charles
Maurras.13 At its basic level, Nolte identified fascism as
“resistance to practical transcendence and struggle against
theoretical transcendence” that achieves power by the very means
it will ultimately seek to deny.14
Nolte’s concept of ‘resistance to transcendence’, which he
argued was a metapolitical aspect of fascism, requires some
explanation because it is not self-evident. Nolte asserted that
resistance to practical transcendence is common to all conservative
societies while he argues that Bolshevism “is the most unequivocal
affirmation of material production and at the same time practical
transcendence."15 In Nolte’s view, conservative societies resist
transcendence while Bolshevism embraces it. Based on the implied
parallel with Bolshevism, transcendence, and industrialization, it
seems reasonable to conclude that what Nolte terms ‘resistance to
transcendence’ is, in fact, resistance to the concept or spirit of
modernity and social progress. Roger Griffin has gone further
arguing that Nolte’s concept of transcendence viewed as a
10

Ibid., 450.
Ibid., 25-26.
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Ibid., 20-21, 25.
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Ibid., 20-21, 69, 140-141, 133-136.
14
Ibid., 450-451, 453-454.
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Ibid., 452.
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metapolitical theory is rooted in a German intellectual tendency to
favor a phenomenological approach to history by focusing on the
“role which key ideas play in the unfolding of events.”16 In
addition, Griffin argues that read in the original German, Nolte’s
concept translated as transcendence in English, has a different
meaning as a result of “the peculiar genius of the German language
for spawning abstract concepts resonant with meanings, which
largely evaporate in translation”. Therefore, Griffin concludes that
what Nolte means by ‘transcendence’ must be understood as the
concept of modernity.17
Nolte has thus advanced both a syncretic thesis for the
inter-war development of fascism, in which the socio-political
reality of post-World War I Europe was catalyzed by an
intellectual movement from France, filtered through Italy and
perfected in Germany, in response to the rise of Marxism, as
embodied by the emergence of the Soviet Union, as well as a
generic theory of fascism as resistance to the concept of modernity
resulting from the denial of both ‘practical transcendence’ physical change - and ‘- theoretical transcendence’ – the
philosophical change of bourgeois society. The contention that
fascism evolved as a direct result of Marxism and the suggestion
that “without Marxism, there is no fascism” coupled with Nolte's
views on the similarities of fascism and Marxism touched off a
massive historical debate.18 Implicit in Three Faces of Fascism,
and rather more explicit in his later work, is the idea that Marxism
and the Soviet Union caused fascism and Nazi Germany and
therefore, caused the Holocaust, as a response to and emulation of
the Russian Gulag system.19 The result was the Historikerstreit,
which started as an argument over the causal nature of Marxism in
the development of National Socialism in Germany but which
quickly escalated. The primary focus of this escalation became the
normalization of the Nazi period within German history and the
argument that conservative historians were attempting to
reinterpret and minimize the atrocities of Nazism.20 As the debate
16

Roger Griffin, International Fascism: Theories Causes and the New
Consensus, (London: Arnold, 1998), 47.
17
Ibid., 47-48.
18
Nolte, 21.
19
Iordachi, 35.
20
Mary Nolan, “The Historikerstreit and Social History,” New German Critique
44 (1988): 1, accessed November 1,2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/488146.
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evolved, it called into question a diverse range of issues, including
what Germany’s relationship to its own history should be, the
nature of German cultural identity and the relationship to fascism
and the appropriateness of studying everyday life and society
under Nazi control given the contemporary political implications
of the historical normalization of this period.21 The centrality,
therefore, of Nolte’s claim that the Gulags and Holocaust were
comparable was that this argument when combined with the
normalization of National Socialism reduced the uniqueness of the
Holocaust and cast it as a reaction to Marxism potentially shifting
ultimate blame away from fascism.22 Independent of Nolte’s
reason for advancing this argument, the debate it spawned,
although acrimonious, was timely and proved a substantial push to
open new paths of research and reflection.
Despite this narrowly defined causal relationship, the
controversial characterization of Action Françoise, the complex
dialectic approach employed, the central focus on Italy and
Germany and resultant lack of an apparent explanation of greater
trends in European fascism, Nolte’s position proved to be
significant to the development both of fascist studies and to the
historiography of fascism because it offered one of the first nonMarxist attempts to advance both a generic theory and
developmental explanation of the fascist phenomenon. It also
formed a foundation for the substantial intellectual stimulation
provided to the field by the Historikerstreit.
Equally important and far less controversial was George L.
Mosse’s attempt to discern a general theory of fascism. Mosse
suggested that in order to understand the pan-European fascist
revolution in a more general sense, a wider comparative approach
was required. Specifically, he suggested that the research
emphasis, then centered on Germany, be widened to look at
movements across Europe and further that movements should be
compared not only on their relative difference but also on their
similarities.23 Mosse approached the creation of a general theory of
fascism by analyzing and critiquing other attempts to establish
such a theory. As a result, his argument emerged largely as a
response to, as well as an attempt to, go beyond the theory of unitotalitarianism, the argument that Bolshevism and fascism
21

Ibid., 2-3.
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constitute essentially similar totalitarian systems established by
Ernst Nolte and others.24
Mosse asserted that fascism is best understood via a
comparative approach as a revolutionary, nationalist, and cultural
mass movement.25 He advocated studying fascism across Europe at
a basic level by analyzing the use of symbolism and language
employed by fascism to understand the essential nature of fascist
movements. For example, based on an analysis of National
Socialism, Mosse suggested that “the myths and symbols of
nationalism were superimposed upon those of Christianity," further
noting that Hitler spoke of the ‘martyrdom’ of party members in
the 1923 coup.26 Therefore, Mosse contended that fascism was a
synthesis of its own ideology and a revolutionary culture in which
“the true community was symbolized by factors opposed to
materialism, by art and literature, the symbols of the past and the
stereotypes of the present."27 He further argued that fascism could
best be understood from its own perspective as a ‘third force’
which borrowed from both the left and the right while offering
unique opportunities for a form of national rebirth and a new
cultural continuity.28
In Mosse’s view, fascism must be studied as a panEuropean or even global phenomenon emphasizing similarities and
differences within a cultural perspective, itself constrained within a
general understanding. In this sense, he presaged the cultural focus
of later authors such as Payne, Griffen and Gentile. Furthermore,
although he doubted whether fascism or National Socialism itself
could ever reemerge, he held that nationalism, the “basic force” of
fascism, remains strong and that the concepts of mass appeal and
use of political mythology and symbolism remain valid concerns
today.29
Nolte’s pioneering work on the nature of fascism in France,
its intellectual genesis and effect on the greater context of 20th
century Europe coupled with Mosse’s comparative emphasis
generated a substantial intellectual discussion over the nature and
24

George L. Mosse, “Toward a General Theory of Fascism,” in Comparative
Fascist Studies, ed., Iordachi, 63.
25
Ibid., 63-64.
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Ibid., 69.
27
Ibid., 70.
28
Ibid., 70,81.
29
Ibid., 90.
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origin of fascism. Although a great deal of scholarship arose as a
result, two particularly different and opposing viewpoints stand
out.
The first was Zeev Sternhell’s Neither Right Nor Left. In
this work the author argued that fascism represented a unique
middle ground as an alternative to liberal democracy and a revolt
against materialism, borrowing aspects from both the left and right
of the political spectrum, while belonging to neither.
The second, Robert Soucy’s French Fascism: The First
Wave 1924-1933, emerged both as a rebuttal to the ‘third way’
argument and as an attempt to clarify the nature of fascism in
France. Soucy argued that fascism in France was a non-foreign,
anti-Marxist, middle-class movement allied to and aligned with the
political right wing.
Flowing in part from Nolte’s dialectic argument for the
origin of European fascism and in response to the, at one time,
widely held contention that fascism in Europe, specifically in
France, was an accident or an historical aberration, Zeev Sternhell
sought to explore the intellectual genesis and development of
fascism in France. He advanced two major contentions. First, he
challenged the idea that fascism was an accident or an aberration,
arguing instead that it “possessed a body of doctrine no less solid
or logically defensible than that of any other political
movement."30 He argued that the idea that fascism was an
aberration of European history is a result of Cold War expedience,
a popular desire not to face the idea that fascism might have grown
out of liberal democracy, and a result of collaborationists seeking
to subsequently re-write their history, especially in France.31
Secondly, he argued that the intellectual genesis of fascism had a
long history in France growing out of the revision of Marxism as a
synthesis of a simultaneous revolt of the left and the right against
liberal democracy, creating a new political ideology in fascism,
which was therefore, neither wholly of the left nor of the right.32
Sternhell focused predominantly on the intellectual basis of
fascism in France both to understand fascism as a political force
and to determine the intellectual origin and creation process behind
the ideology. He argued that France was the first country to
30

Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right Nor Left, trans. David Maisel (Berkley:
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31
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develop the “essential characteristics of fascism” and that fascism
had coalesced into a political force there more rapidly than
elsewhere.33 The outcome of the First World War was therefore
only the catalyst to the political actualization of fascism and not its
origin as others have suggested. The framework of fascism
predated the war even if the label did not. The actual genesis of
fascism, Sternhell argued, was found in the 1880s as a fully
matured intellectual movement arising out of a synthesis of a new
nationalism which was breaking away from the traditional right
and a new socialism which was breaking away from the left
unified in their shared opposition to social democracy.34 This cause
was then taken up and expanded upon by French intellectuals. As a
result of the writings by Georges Sorel, Maurice Barrès and the
Cercle Proudhon French fascism quickly became as much an
intellectual endeavor as a mass movement, implicitly conferring a
certain respectability and legitimacy.35
Sternhell therefore argued that because of this intellectual
tradition, France became a “laboratory in which the original
political synthesis of our time was created,” a tradition which drew
elements and even people from both ends of the political
spectrum.36 This transition, Sternhell, contended was exemplified
by the writings of Sorel a leftist and originally a proponent of
Marxism who shifted over a period of several years until he went
well beyond Marxism to embrace a proto-fascist perspective. Sorel
opposed the materialistic elements of Marxism and encouraged a
focus on revolutionary moral regeneration, eventually replacing the
proletariat mass movement with the personification of the state,
creating a revitalist national socialism. In light of this example
Sternhell suggested that fascism should be seen as the result of a
gradual revision of Marxism toward a national socialism in
response to the crisis of capitalism, which spawned revisionist
movements on both the left and the right of the political spectrum
and forged a middle ground born of both perspectives.37
Consequently, for Sternhell, the key to understanding the
rise of fascism was as a revolt against liberal democracy and an
attempt to reinvent society along anti-materialist lines. In the
33
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process Marxism, liberalism and democracy must be rejected as
manifestations of the same defective concept.38 As Sternhell stated,
the minimum characteristic of fascism, therefore, is that: “fascism
derived its power from its universality, from being the product of a
crisis of civilization."39 This process, he argues, was gradual,
embodied in revisionist waves, created by social upheaval and
stress. These included industrialization during the 1890s, the First
World War, an economic stress of the 1930s. However, these were
only catalysts; the real engine which created groups like Action
Françoise and Sorelian Syndicalism, he argued was the inability of
the movements from which they arose to effectively address the
crisis of liberal democracy.40
Consequently, in Sternhell’s assessment, a political
movement evolved based on anti-materialism and was marked by a
revolutionary character, which sought to establish itself as distinct
from the past, and rooted in its own traditions. As such fascism
desired to overcome the class structure and establish a collectivist
society in the form of a revitalized nation created through the
reformative and almost spiritual power of national will.41 This
society would additionally overcome individualism and provide a
unifying morality not found in liberalism or Marxism while
simultaneously embracing a modernist or futurist intellectual,
artistic and literary trend - in essence, a utopianism.42
He concluded that fascism was a political movement as real
as Marxism and liberalism, which possessed a distinct political
narrative, including elements from both sides of the political
spectrum, but fundamentally independent of both. Fascism, he
asserted, can therefore only arise when a sufficient intellectual
basis exists and that while an economic or social crisis may
advance fascists as a political force, “the most dangerous enemies
of the dominant political culture [liberal democracy] were the
intellectual dissidents and rebels, of both the new right and the new
left."43 The key then to fascist movements, although perhaps not to
regimes, is a strong base of fascist intellectual ideology channeled

38
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by a national crisis without which he suggests fascism is not
possible.44
In response, Soucy suggested that fascism emerged in
France between the world wars and evolved in two major
impulses. The first impulse started in 1926 and was subsequently
followed by a second in 1934. Further he asserted that French
fascism did not simply appear, but instead had a long
developmental heritage in French political culture. Soucy sought to
“lay to rest several misconceptions about French fascism that have
dominated much of the scholarly literature on the subject since the
Second World War."45 Soucy presented arguments against five
major contentions regarding French fascism: first, fascism was a
foreign idea with little support; second, nationalist groups were not
fascist; third, fascism was in conflict with conservatism; fourth,
fascism was anti-capitalist anti-establishment, reactionary and
emerging from the left or as a third way and finally; fifth, fascism
was a passing cultural fad with poorly articulated goals and
doctrines borrowing elements from both ends of the spectrum.46
These ideas, Soucy suggested were dated and inaccurate
historical understandings resulting from a lack of deep critical
inquiry. Instead working from the writings of fascist and protofascist movements and from a detailed body of French police
informant reports, he argued that a distinction must be made
between the rhetoric of socialism employed by French fascists and
the conservative content of the fascist message which often saw
parliamentary conservatives allied to fascists in times of perceived
socio-economic crisis.47
Soucy held that fascism in France had a long
developmental history reaching back in the most formative sense
to the revolutionary period and the Paris Commune from which he
argued came the tradition of insurrection and political violence to
achieve change, which although originally a tool of the left, came
to be embraced by the right in the 1890s.48 For Soucy, the origins
of fascism are found in the 1880s and 90s among the Ligue des
Patriotes and similar movements as a middle-class, nationalist,
44

Ibid., 294.
Robert Soucy, French Fascism: The Third Wave, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1986), xiii.
46
Ibid., xiii-xv.
47
Ibid., xv.
48
Ibid., 3-4.
45

12

Glenn-Iain Steinback

capitalist response to fears of socialism and economic and ethnic
changes resultant from the second wave of the industrial revolution
in France.49 This trend, he argued, found vent in 1898 as a result of
the Dryfus Affair in which a Jewish army officer was wrongly
accused and convicted of espionage. This catalyzed anti-Jewish
sentiment already inflamed by a banking collapse blamed on
Jewish bankers and by a railroad workers strike that touched off a
wave of labor unrest and once again raised the specter of socialism.
The outcome was an alliance of political convenience between
proto-fascist groups and monarchists financed by frightened
capitalist business interests.50 The resulting coup attempt, however,
failed. The socialist threat never materialized and the
parliamentarian right, once no longer threatened, backed away
from extreme rightist movements.
Despite this failure, the event did establish a pattern, which
Soucy argued was repeated twice more before the Second World
War. Once again, in 1924, following the election of the Cartel Des
Gauches’ center-left coalition government with a partially socialist
agenda that recognized the Soviet Union. They conjured fears of
Bolshevism and sought closer international relations with Britain
and the United States, while angering nationalists and alienated
Catholics because of its treatment of the Vatican.51 These decisions
estranged nationalists, Catholics and conservatives simultaneously.
Some of whom once again began to support right wing interests many of which were now truly fascist, influenced by the
establishment of a fascist regime in Italy two years prior.52 The
second time was in 1932 when a second wave of fascism was
generated for similar reasons following the election of a left-ofcenter government and in response to the depression.53
Consequently, Soucy argued that fascism in France was not
an alien concept. It had deep intellectual roots there, arising
periodically from the French middle-class in response to periods of
economic or social stress and times of apparent rising leftist
influence. It was he asserted therefore closely associated with
conservative industrialists who simultaneously provided the
necessary capital to fund political action and lent form to fascist
49
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movements, and their speaking tours and newspapers and political
action.54 In addition, he suggested that fascism in France was not a
third way or ‘neither left nor right’ as Sternhell believed. Instead, it
absorbed policies and rhetoric from the left, while its core
economic and social values remained closely aligned with the right
with which it “disagreed only on political grounds."55 Finally,
Soucy argued that fascism from a theoretical, if not strictly
taxonomic point of view, may be seen as an outgrowth of liberal
democracy itself, which when under stress may experience a
conversion of existing rightist elements to embrace or at least forge
alliances with the authoritarian right.56
Building on the comparative approach and cultural focus,
beginning in the late 1970s Juan J. Linz advanced a framework for
comparative fascism, informed by theoretical as well as historical
evidence and grounded in a comparative sociological approach.57
Linz’s major contribution was to broaden the field of fascist
studies by arguing that fascism was a legitimate socio-political
movement and that other fascist style movements in Europe and
elsewhere were not simply offshoots of the two distinct fascist
regimes, but rather the collective result of similar historical
conditions, consequently, suggesting that fascist movements did
not necessarily evolve as a direct result of contact with other
fascist regimes, but as a result of similar conditions acting on the
unique historical traditions of countries around the world. The
resulting approach was the first multi-dimensional, ideal-type
model of fascism, which would prove a major catalyst to the future
direction of research.58
Paradoxically, although these new lines of comparative
inquiry expanded the view of fascism well beyond the Marxist
economic argument or the focus on Italy and Germany, it did
nothing to foster agreement. By the early 1980s the consequence
was a multiplicity of competing theories, each claiming to have
discovered the singular cause of fascism and a series of typological
debates over which movements qualified as truly fascist rendering
the very concept of generic fascism almost useless.59 The effect
54

Ibid., 217-219.
Ibid., 235.
56
Ibid., 238.
57
Iordachi, 10.
58
Ibid., 11.
59
Ibid., 15.
55

14

Glenn-Iain Steinback

was a reductionist search for a ‘fascist minimum’ and division of
fascist studies into two broad methodological camps. The first
camp was an inductive-observational school, which studied
empirical evidence and case studies of inter-war fascism to derive
commonalities by evaluating every aspect of a fascist movement.
The second school used a theoretical and often ideological model,
which was then measured against case studies to evaluate common
characteristics in the search for the fascist core and discarding
elements specific to individual fascist movements.60
Italian historians Renzo De Felice and Emilio Gentile
subsequently extended the inductive model. De Felice argued that
fascism should be seen as a revolutionary mass movement, which
when placed in power became subordinate to a leftist style
totalitarian regime. De Felice opposed broad attempts to form an
all-encompassing model while acknowledging the idea of a basic
fascist minimum.61 Gentile went further, asserting that the
complexity of fascism cannot be simplified to an ideological core
but must consider social, political and historical factors
simultaneously. He produced a ten point descriptive definition of
fascism, which considered fascism as an ideology, a movement
and a regime.62 Building on this work in the early 1990s, some
historians have sought to revive the concept of the fascist
minimum and move the discussion away from broad generic
models. One of the leading proponents of this approach was Roger
Griffin, who attempted to offer an ideal type for fascism by
focusing exclusively on ideology to construct a fascist minimum
based not on the stated ideological ideas of individual leaders or
movements, but at the most basic underlying level of a ‘mythic
core’.63 This core, he argued, creates a mythic, palingenetic and
nationalist narrative, which serves as an alternative course to
modernity. From this he defined a ‘fascist matrix’ to be used as an
evaluative heuristic.64
As might be expected, Griffin’s ideas stimulated much
scholarly debate and research both in support and opposition of his
premise. Some, such as Robert Paxton opposed the concept of a
60
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fascist minimum as too restrictive because it did not account for
social and political motivations. Instead, Paxton purposed to
“examine the phenomenon as a system” and emphasized the need
to consider the evolution of fascist groups by studying their
developmental stages, comparing different groups at similar
stages.65 Paxton divided fascism into five stages ranging from an
initial developmental stage to a fully-fledged radical regime.66
Others, such as sociologist Michael Mann, objected to Griffin’s
theory on the grounds that it has not adequately addressed social
composition, organizational structure and the role of fascism in
nationalism and the nation-state in the twentieth century.67 Mann
developed his own theory of generic fascism by studying the sociopolitical environments of the major fascist regimes of Europe,
resulting in a definition of fascism: “Fascism is the pursuit of a
transcendent and cleansing nation-stateism through paramilitaries,”
concluding that fascism was and indeed is part of the “dark side of
modernity."68
On the other side of this debate are scholars such as Stanley
Payne, who accepted the concept of a fascist minimum but rejected
both overly broad and overly specific attempts to define it.69
Instead, Payne has argued that in order to understand fascism a
duel approach must be taken, utilizing a generic concept of fascism
as an analytical aid to the empirical study of inter-war fascist
regimes and movements, the result of which is a working
definition of fascism.70 This working definition, with a proper
appreciation for national variance can be used as a measure to
assess the nature of right-wing groups and quantify them into one
of three broad categories: fascists, the Radical Right and the
Conservative Right.71
Payne, therefore, concluded that fascism was a
revolutionary movement originating in the cultural crisis of the
early twentieth century and independent of any specific
organization or class, characterized by extreme nationalism and
possessing distinct political, social and economic goals, which
65
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placed substantial value on “idealism, willpower, vitalism and
mysticism” as well as the “moralistic concept of therapeutic
violence."72 The result of this analysis is the Retrodictive Theory
of Fascism, a matrix of cultural, political, social, and economic and
international factors, which establish the specific circumstances
present which are necessary for a country to develop a viable
fascist movement.73 This point is qualified with the additional
caveat that Payne saw fascism and therefore, his Retrodictive
Theory, as applicable only to European nations in the historical
moment of the early twentieth century.
Payne’s work is important to the field of fascist studies
because he sought to develop an analytical understanding of
fascism. He has done this by combining a theoretical and historical
approach while acknowledging the unique aspects of fascism in
different countries and between different stages of development.74
The outcome of this wide-ranging study was a retrodictive theory
of inter-war European fascism that posited an alternative to the
ideological minimum proposed by Griffin and instead purposed a
series of socio-political and economic requirements for the
development of a fascist movement in any one country between the
wars. In essence, an empirical fascist minimum, additionally
providing an essential and flexible tool for the analysis and
evaluation of historical fascist or proto fascist movements that
attempts to take the broader sweep of fascist characteristics into
consideration.75
Having now observed several different and often opposing
perspectives on the development and origin of fascism as a crisis
of capitalism, the result of syncretism, a regenerative mass
movement and the result of an early twentieth century revolt
against modernity; it is worth considering Steven Aschheim’s
discussion of the centrality of ideational motivations to the
understanding and development of fascism and specifically
National Socialism. Writing in the early 1990s, following the
explosion of published literature and developmental theories of
fascism during the preceding two decades, Aschheim sought to
evaluate the centrality of Nietzsche to the development of National
Socialism in Germany. Aschheim argued that an appropriation of
72
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Nietzsche’s ideas was central to the development and operation of
National Socialism. He wrote, “The marriage between Nietzsche
and National Socialism was authorized and consummated at the
highest levels and accompanied by fanfare and publicity."76
Nietzsche’s ideas, he suggested, were important to National
Socialism because they provided a deep background against which
National Socialist policies were modeled. Nietzsche’s ideas,
especially his later writings, found a very receptive audience in the
dynamic intellectual period at the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century. In response to a social
climate increasingly obsessed with decadence he offered a
rejuvenative new man and society.77 From these ideas Aschheim
argued National Socialism drew the rejection of bourgeois society,
liberalism and democracy as well as a force for creative
regeneration in the form of the will of society. The result would be
the total reinvention and revitalization of the German people
discarding materialist concepts to be replaced by “an instinctual,
renaturalized, vitalistic and tragic culture."78
Aschheim also argued that Nietzsche served three other
important functions for the National Socialists. First, he conveyed
a well-respected and distinguished intellectual element to National
Socialism, which allowed the incorporation of cultured
intellectuals who might have otherwise been uncomfortable with
National Socialist rhetoric.79 Simultaneously, Nietzsche provided a
body of literature, which could be invoked to rationalize and
explain the nature of the movement in intellectual terms. Lastly,
Nietzsche’s philosophy provided the justification, if not the basis,
for euthanasia and the acceptability of racial cleansing as a means
to ensure the health of society, suppression of decadents and
prosperity of the Übermensch.80 Aschheim takes care to point out
that this last goal was only achieved with a ‘careful’ and selective
National Socialist reading of Nietzsche’s works.
Aschheim has acknowledged freely and frequently in his
own work, that he is by no means the first historian to discuss the
so-called Nietzsche-Nazi link. Traditional Marxist historians
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generally view Nietzsche’s influence as an extension of the
capitalist suppression of the proletariat.81 For Nolte, the Nazi
policy of extermination is grounded in the legitimatization of
destruction in the interests of rejuvenation found in Nietzsche.82
While others such as Sternhell saw the legacy of Nietzsche
creating the road to the mass appeal of fascism and Payne
considered Nietzsche integral to the underlying will to power
inherent in fascism and the concept of societal superiority.83
However, for these authors and others like them, Nietzsche and his
impact on the underlying ideas of fascism were generally only part
of a larger explanation, or sometimes only tangential. Aschheim’s
major contribution, therefore, was the premise that explanations
which “entirely dismiss Nazism’s frame of mind and render
ideational motivations as mere background leave an essential
dimension untapped,” are ignoring not only a relevant but also
critical piece of the puzzle.84 For Aschheim, National Socialism in
particular, and fascism in general, were multifaceted complex
systems, which require equally dynamic explanations. However, he
argued that no evaluation could be complete unless it also
considers the ideological core; a core which he suggests is based
firmly, although not exclusively on an appropriation of Nietzsche’s
philosophical positions as the “key to explaining national
socialisms attraction to the outmost limits."85
More recently the debate within fascist historiography has
come to focus on the concept of political religions in totalitarian
states partly as a result of increased attention given to unitotalitarianism and comparative studies of communism and fascism
and by increased focus on the causes for the Holocaust.86 Although
the concept of political religion is not new, the application of the
concept to recent fascist studies has in large part been due to the
work of Emilio Gentile notable for his earlier ten point descriptive
definition of fascism. This hypothesis has matured into a
groundbreaking theory on totalitarianism and sacralization of
politics. Gentile defines the regime stage of fascism as a
totalitarian system, which utilizes a palingenetic ideology
81
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interpreted as political religion to shape the development of a new
man and new society.87 In addition, Gentile demonstrated how the
politics of the modern nation state can, and in his estimation have,
become sacralized in both democratic and totalitarian societies as
nationalism creates a religious type belief in the state.88 Although
his theory is contentious, it has offered a compelling explanation
for the mass appeal of fascism as well as the use of mysticism,
messianic leadership, and mythical symbolism in fascist
movements.89
Understandably, this theory has proven controversial, and
yet it has also proven to be an important stimulus to new ideas and
approaches in the study of fascism in recent years. Although
initially, an opponent, Griffin subsequently revised his theory of
the fascist minimum to incorporate political religion, arguing that a
belief in and veneration of the state was important to fascist
movements. He has come to contend that this is especially true
early in development as the tool of cultural reinvention underlying
the palingenetic nature of fascism.90 Other scholars have disagreed
with this concept arguing, as Richard Steinman-Gall has, that the
return of the political religion theory is a result of post-Cold War
revisionism.91 Instead, he argued that fascism exhibits religious
politics not political religion and as such religious elements are
appropriated for political purposes but do not, in and of
themselves, represent a separate, true secular or political religion.92
As we have seen beginning almost concurrently with the
first flowering of fascist movements in Europe during the 1920s,
attempts have been made to classify, understand and describe
them. This essay has attempted to summarize and analyze some of
the key developments in the historiography of fascism. It has not
attempted to cover every author or even every argument but rather
to highlight a path of historiographic development. As
87
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demonstrated here, a wide range of theories and ideas have been
advanced. The early Marxist theorists presented fascism as a
reactionary tool of capitalism. Nolte attempted to set fascism in a
broader context via a reactionary evolutionary dialectic, in the
process, bringing about a highly contentious and ultimately
profitable debate over the nature of fascist studies and Europe’s
relationship with its past. Mosse as we have seen sought to widen
the intellectual field by urging comparison and analysis outside of
the major fascist powers of Western Europe and helping to seat
fascism as a pan-European phenomenon. Sternhell echoing an
element of the controversy of the historikerstreit argued that
fascism was not an aberration and made a case for its intellectual
roots in France as a third way. While Soucy, also addressing
France, asserted that fascism was decidedly an outgrowth of the
right and argued that the potential for fascism was an outgrowth of
liberal democracy. Linz echoed Mosses’s appeal for wider study
and suggested that fascism was a pan-European phenomenon
resulting from a similar set of circumstance and not an intellectual
export of Western Europe. Gentile attempted to develop a heuristic
for measuring fascist movements by extending the concept of a
fascist minimum and then later contributed the theory that fascism
was inexorably linked to the concept of political religion which he
suggests was inherent in nationalism. Griffin argued for an
emphasis on the basic ideology of fascist groups on a ‘mythic core’
to which he later adapted the political religion theory in an attempt
to articulate a better analytical device. While Payne suggested that
previous theories of fascist minimums and matrixes were
insufficient instead articulating a ‘retrodictive theory’ which
attempted to establish the minimum necessary preconditions for
the development of a successful fascist movement. Finally,
Aschheim argued that in order to properly understand fascists one
must understand their ‘mindset,’ arguing for the centrality of
Nietzsche as an ideological genesis and intellectual justification for
fascism and specifically National Socialism.
It is therefore, not surprising that fascist studies have
moved from an obscure discipline to a major field of investigation
complete with its own journals. In the process, it has also
undergone a corresponding shift toward broader evaluations of the
topic and been subjected increasingly to the addition of much
needed inter-disciplinary approaches as it has become clear that
fascism is an extremely complex topic incorporating social,
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political and economic facets. Correspondingly this has
encouraged a much-needed division of fascism into developmental
stages and an emphasis on the consideration of movements especially in Eastern Europe - on their own merits as part of a
greater trend. Finally, the introduction of political sacralization and
political religion theories, have examined and illuminated the
nationalist methodologies of fascism. In summary, within this now
rich field of academic inquiry much has been written and
remarkable progress made considering the relatively young topic.
However, despite this it remains likely that no theory yet offered is
able to account for the vast complexity of fascism and therefore, no
overarching consensus or definitive narrative is likely to develop at
any point in the near future.
A substantial debate has focused on the nature of fascist
movements and whether fascism was limited to a specific
historical period or represents an ongoing political ideology
present even today. Recent events have shown that fascist style
movements are currently active in Hungary and Greece and that
these groups are well organized with defined political goals. In
Greece, a country currently faced with major economic uncertainty
and an ineffective government, Golden Dawn, formed in 1985, has
recently risen to become the third most popular party in Greece.93
Capitalizing on economic devastation, anti-immigrant sentiment
and a loss of confidence in the political system Golden Dawn won
nearly seven percent of the popular vote and eighteen seats in
parliament during recent elections. More importantly, Golden
Dawn is an openly fascist political party that employs familiar
tactics, including organized street violence against minorities,
maintains a newspaper, cultivates appeal as a mass movement,
provides support to disadvantaged persons, and has adopted a
paramilitary structure.94 Today, Golden Dawn is offering itself as
an alternative and rejuvenating political force in Greek society.
While in Hungary, Jobbik has emerged as a nationalist, antiimmigrant and anti-Roma political party, which maintains a militia
movement, employs hate marches and intimidation while also
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holding seats in parliament.95 Both groups espouse xenophobic,
highly nationalistic anti-immigrant, anti-foreign rhetoric and
promise some form of national rebirth or reinvention. By any
reasonable definition, they are fascists.
For these reasons, the study of fascism remains important.
While the perspective one chooses to take of fascism, its precursor
right authoritarianism or totalitarianism depends upon the
intellectual school to which one subscribes and is thus a complex
topic. It is clear, as Sternhell has demonstrated that fascism was
not an aberration of late nineteenth–early twentieth-century
Europe. It had deeper roots. While, given historical outcomes, it is
hopeful that a ‘fascist’ group will never again rise to significance.
The ultimate conclusions reached by Soucy, Aschheim and Gentile
are important because they suggest that the methods by which
fascist type groups gain and wield power may not, in fact, be
limited to a specific moment in time. Soucy suggests that right
wing authoritarianism is an outgrowth of conservative elements in
liberal democracies during times of social and economic stress.
Aschheim offers an analysis of the means by which an ideological
core can be used as legitimizing justification for atrocities, while
replacing or setting aside existing social morés. And lastly, there is
continuing relevance to be found in Gentile’s argument that
political religion and religious type beliefs, in the character or
persona of the state, are inherent concepts of nationalism, which
can potentially be exploited to develop mass appeal and justify
right wing or totalitarian conversion of a nation. Taken together
and given the state of affairs in the United States and Europe
today, marked by escalating regionalism, the growth of
conservatism and the growing legitimization of conservative fringe
movements, as well as increasing acceptance of polarization in
contemporary politics, there is reason to suggest that these theories
may prove to have an enduring relevance in the twenty-first
century.
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